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edited by

R. N. FRYE

Professor of Iranian, Harvard University



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CHAPTER 2

THE 'ABBĀSID CALIPHATE IN IRAN

On 3 Rabī' I 132/20 October 749 Abu'l-'Abbās 'Abd-Allāh b. Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. 'Abd-Allāh b. al-'Abbās, after receiving the oath of allegiance as caliph, spoke in the mosque of Kūfa until, weakened by fever, he sat down in the pulpit while his uncle finished the speech for him. The speech served as an inaugural address for this first 'Abbāsid caliph and clearly outlined both the discontents which had encouraged the revolution against the Umayyads, and the claims of the 'Abbāsids to restrict the caliphate of the Islamic community to the members of their own family. Even if the authenticity of the speech is difficult to establish, it faithfully reflects the tone of 'Abbāsid rule during the following two hundred years:

Praise be to God . . . who has given us ties of relation and kinship with the Messenger of God, and has brought us forth from his fathers . . . and has placed us in respect to Islam and its people in an exalted position . . . He has informed them of our excellence and made it obligatory for them to render us our right and to love us . . . The erring Sabā'iyya have claimed that someone other than us has a greater right than we to leadership, administration and the caliphate . . . How so and why so, oh people? It is through us that God has guided men after their erring and enlightened them after their ignorance . . . God tolerated [the Umayyad usurpers] for a while, until they angered Him; and when they angered Him, He avenged Himself on them at our hands and returned our right to us . . . Oh people of Kūfa, you are the object of our love and affection. You have been constant in that love, your mistreatment by the oppressors has not turned you from it until you reached our time and God brought you our turn in power (*daula*), and so you have become the happiest of people through us and the most honoured by us. We have increased your [yearly] stipends by one hundred *dirhams*. Hold yourselves ready, for I am the pitiless bloodshedder (*al-saffāh*) and the destroying avenger.

At this point, Abu'l-'Abbās, overcome by his fever, sat down. His uncle continued in the same vein, declaring that the 'Abbāsids had revolted partly because the Umayyads had mistreated "the sons of our uncle" (the 'Alids), and had taken exclusive possession "of the revenue rights (*fai*)" of the community which are yours and of your

charitable taxes (*ṣadaqāt*) and of your plunder (*maghānim*)". He asserted that, in contrast, the 'Abbāsids would rule according to the Qur'ān and the example of Muḥammad. He said that "God has given us as our party (*shī'a*) the people of Khurāsān . . . and has caused a caliph to appear amongst you from the descendants of Hāshim and [shown favour to] you through him and given you ascendancy over the Syrians and transferred the government to you . . . So take what God has given you with gratitude; remain obedient to us; and do not mistake your position – for this is your affair . . . Know," he concluded, "that this authority is ours and will not leave us till we hand it over to Jesus son of Mary."¹

The 'Abbāsids, therefore, claimed that recognition of their right to the caliphate was obligatory, and that they received their authority by divine mandate and not by the agreement of men. In this speech, while no genealogical proof of the 'Abbāsids' right is offered, Abu'l-'Abbās is presented as a descendant of Hāshim – an ancestor of the 'Alids, the Ja'farids and the 'Abbāsids – and as the common avenger of the entire family of Muḥammad. Only the extremist *Shī'ī* beliefs of the Sabā'iyya (or Saba'iyya), who revered 'Alī as divine, are specifically rejected. Up to this moment, 'Abbāsid propaganda had been carried out and the oath of allegiance taken in the name of *al-riḍā min āl Muḥammad*, "the one of Muḥammad's family who would be agreed upon" – a designation which left room for both 'Abbāsids and 'Alids. Abu'l-'Abbās made it clear that the Kūfans, who had especially hated Umayyad rule, were to be materially rewarded and restored to the place of honour which they had held when 'Alī brought the caliphate to their city. Hence, by implication, the non-Syrian provinces, formerly held in check by the Syrian troops which were the military basis of the Umayyad empire, would be free from this domination. However, not all these provinces would contribute equally to the military basis of the new caliphate, for the "party" which supported the new empire by force of arms was the army of Khurāsān. Many Muslims felt that continued Umayyad government would bring the destruction of Islam, and Abu'l-'Abbās promised them that the 'Abbāsids would answer the growing desire to see a truly Islamic government, conducted according to the Qur'ān and the *sunna*. The financial rights of the Muslims would be restored to the community as a whole after they had been usurped by the Umayyads.

¹ Tabarī, vol. III, pp. 29–33. At least two other dates are given for this speech.

When Abu'l-'Abbās accepted the oath of allegiance or *bai'a*, the success of the 'Abbāsids was far from assured. Marwān II was in Syria preparing for a decisive battle, and his chief lieutenant, Ibn Hubaira, was encamped with an Umayyad army at Wāsiṭ. Even the loyalty of the chief partisan of the 'Abbāsids at Kūfa, Abū Salama al-Khallāl, was doubtful because he had forced Abu'l-'Abbās and his relatives to remain in hiding several weeks after the contingents of the Khurāsānian army had arrived in that city; and it was rumoured that he favoured transferring the caliphate to the 'Alids. The military threat from the Umayyads, however, was soon over; the victory of the 'Abbāsids on the Upper Zāb (11 Jumādā II 132/25 January 750) was complete and the army of Ibn Hubaira surrendered after a long resistance had finally been made hopeless by the desertion of the southern Arabs, who had for years disliked Marwān's rule.

This chapter gives an account of all the principal political events in Iran under the 'Abbāsids, and then discusses the long-term significance of these events for the history of that country; but it should never be forgotten that the 'Abbāsids intended to create and for a time nearly succeeded in creating a universal Islamic empire. When Zaidī 'Alid pretenders rebelled in the Yemen and in Māzandarān they posed essentially similar political threats to the 'Abbāsids. Consequently, the actions of the central government, and the reactions of the Iranian Muslims under 'Abbāsid rule, were always more subject to Islamic considerations than to any specific feeling about Iranians as a group.

The success of the 'Abbāsid revolution has often been viewed as a success by Iranians over Arabs; but a very great number of the soldiers and propagandists who won and maintained 'Abbāsid rule were Arabs, and there is little sign that the Iranian supporters of the dynasty in the early period were anti-Arab. In the Umayyad period the 'Abbāsid family had fostered an extensive and complex network of secret adherents, and the victory of the 'Abbāsids probably encouraged many later Islamic revolutionary movements to imitate their example. The first members of this network in southern Iraq were *mawālī* – non-Arab converts to Islam – and southern Arabs, especially the Banū Musliyya; and the 'Abbāsid movement was sustained right through to its victory by the efforts of both Arabs and Iranians. A document of the late 120s/740s shows that at that time the secret organization in Khurāsān was led by twelve *naqībs*, most of whom were Arab. The original 'Abbāsid army was quite naturally in large proportion and perhaps in



Map. 1. Iran under the 'Abbāsids

majority Arab, for the standing army of the Muslims in Khurāsān was overwhelmingly Arab, and the help of this army was essential to the success of any military effort. Abū Muslim, the Iranian architect of the 'Abbāsid uprising in Khurāsān, recognized the importance of Arab adherents and found among the Arabs as well as among the Iranians many eager to support a complete change of government. A large number of Arab tribesmen in Khurāsān had struck roots in that province and become interested in agriculture and trade, and were unwilling to engage in the continual campaigning which the Umayyad governors had demanded of them. Therefore, they had been dropped from the muster lists, and, to their annoyance, the Umayyad government made them – like the non-Arab population of Khurāsān – pay their land taxes through the largely non-Muslim Iranian large holders called the *dihqāns*. They had lost not only the advantage of being Arabs, but they were even partly governed by non-Arabs; and only a change of dynasty, not merely of governors, seemed likely to improve their lot. When in Ramaḍān 130/May 748 (or, according to other historians, 1 Shawwāl 129/15 June 747) Abū Muslim began recruiting an army openly, he registered soldiers not according to their tribes, as the Umayyads had done, but according to their place of residence. This reform not only diminished the spirit of tribal solidarity which had caused nearly continual war in preceding years but also suited the new situation of the more settled and Iranized Arabs of the Marv region, as well as the situation of the Iranian Muslim population who shared many of their interests. Meanwhile, the fight between the southern Arabs regularly listed on the muster lists and the Umayyad governor Naṣr b. Sayyār, who was also the leader of the northern Arab regulars, was dragging on inconclusively; and Abū Muslim, with great skill, also persuaded many of these southern Arabs to join his army.

If, however, many of the soldiers in the first 'Abbāsid army were of Arab ancestry, the army was seen not as Arab or Iranian but as Khurāsānian. The soldiers of this army spoke *luḡha ahl Khurāsān*, the speech of the people of Khurāsān, and do not seem to have greatly cared which of their fellow soldiers were of Arab ancestry, and which of Iranian – for Iranians were unquestionably present in the army. The 'Abbāsid government claimed that it was truly Islamic, and therefore expected the passive obedience of all Muslims; but it reserved a privileged position for the soldiers of this Khurāsānian army who were called “sons of the daula” (*abnā' al-daula*) and whose children inherited

this distinction. Even Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868–9) who wrote when the descendants of this first Khurāsānian army ceased to be important militarily, called the 'Abbāsids “Khurāsānian and non-Arab (*a'jamī*)”.¹ Nevertheless, the early 'Abbāsīd basis of power was not so much the entire province of Khurāsān, parts of which rebelled repeatedly against the first 'Abbāsīd caliphs, as a specific Khurāsānian army stationed in Iraq.

The destruction of the Umayyads did not bring peace to the Islamic empire, and the first two 'Abbāsīd caliphs found themselves embarrassingly dependent on Abū Muslim to keep order in their new dominions. The 'Abbāsīd revolution had been conducted on behalf of an imām whose name remained hidden until its final stages, and it therefore raised hopes even among non-Muslim peoples, who were affected by the expectation of a universal saviour which had become widespread at the end of the Umayyad period. Forces which had despaired of a change of régime during the seventy years of Umayyad rule were encouraged by the revolution to come into the open. In the first years of the new caliphate Abū Muslim rendered great services to his 'Abbāsīd masters by defeating their external and internal enemies. He received the governorship of Khurāsān, where he had many devoted followers, and of the Jibāl. His lieutenant defeated the Chinese in central Asia in July 751, after which Chinese influence in this area greatly decreased; and a pro-'Alid uprising which started among the Arabs in Bukhārā was suppressed in 133/750–1. In 132 Abū Muslim sent Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath to govern Fārs and to hunt down the representatives of the philo-'Alid Abū Salama al-Khallāl, who had himself been killed in the same year. The caliph, constrained to get Abū Muslim's approval for Abū Salama's execution even though it took place in Iraq, tried to exert his authority over Fārs by sending his uncle, 'Īsā b. 'Alī, to claim control of that province. But Ibn al-Ash'ath would not let him perform the duties of a governor, and it became increasingly urgent for the caliph to find a way of dealing with Abū Muslim, his over-powerful subject. The caliph, however, was able to control the governorships of Ahvāz and Āzarbāijān. In 135/752–3 Abu'l-'Abbās secretly encouraged two lieutenants of Abū Muslim to revolt in Khurāsān, but they were defeated.

When Abu'l-'Abbās died in the night on 13 Dhu'l-Hijja 136/8 or 9 June 754 he was succeeded, as he had arranged, by his brother Abū

¹ *al-Bayān*, vol. III (Cairo, 1947), p. 206, cited in Zarrīnkūb, p. 487.

Ja'far who took the throne title of al-Manṣūr. While the continued life of the new dynasty seemed uncertain in the reign of Abu'l-'Abbās, the long reign of his forceful brother saw the power of the 'Abbāsids consolidated throughout the empire. On his accession al-Manṣūr was faced with the revolt of his uncle who as governor of Syria commanded a large army, and Abū Muslim was sent against him in the hope that one of the two would be eliminated. After his victory (7 Jumādā II 137/26 or 27 November 754) Abū Muslim disregarded al-Manṣūr's order that he stay in the provinces he had occupied, and openly said that "He makes me governor of Syria and Egypt; but Khurāsān belongs to me!" Finally, to prevent Abū Muslim's return, al-Manṣūr gave the governorship of Khurāsān to Abū Dā'ūd whom Abū Muslim had left there as his representative; and Abū Muslim, finding that his way back was blocked, and still hopeful that al-Manṣūr intended no harm, went to the caliph who killed him in Sha'bān 137/February 755.

Abū Muslim's importance as the living link between the emerging central government and the province from which it drew its military manpower and its most fervent adherents was now made apparent by the long series of revolts in Khurāsān which followed his execution. The first of these was the revolt of Sunbādh in 138/755. Sunbādh was not a Muslim and the participation of non-Muslims in most of these revolts indicates how much the non-Arab peoples of Iran and Transoxiana had felt somehow identified with the state under Abū Muslim. Sunbādh was killed seventy days after he revolted but his movement had attracted enormous numbers to its standard, including many farmers from the Jibāl, and helped to form a clandestine religious group called the Bū-Muslimiyya which continued to foster anti-'Abbāsīd feeling for many years. In 140/758 dissension which broke out in the 'Abbāsīd army in Khurāsān resulted in the death of Abū Dā'ūd, the governor, and the death of the sub-governors of Bukhārā and Kūhistān at the hands of the new governor Abū Ja'far 'Abd al-Jabbār. When the Khurāsānians complained to al-Manṣūr about the harshness of his appointee, the caliph decided that "'Abd al-Jabbār is destroying our party (shī'a)" and sent an army which defeated and killed him.¹

The revolts of Ustādhsīs and al-Muqanna' like that of Sunbādh had extensive local support. Ustādhsīs, who attracted followers principally from the regions of Herāt, Bādghīs and Sīstān, defeated the garrison

¹ Ṭabarī, vol. III, p. 134.

at Marv ar-Rūd. Finally al-Manṣūr sent a large army which defeated Ustādhīs in 151/768. The rising of al-Muqanna' had a more specifically religious colouring. After starting the rebellion in Khurāsān, he moved to the region of Kish and Nasaf in Transoxiana where supporters of Abū Muslim were numerous and where there had been an earlier and unsuccessful rebellion against the 'Abbāsids led by Ishāq the Turk, so called because he had been a *dā'i* or propagandist sent by Abū Muslim to the Turks. Al-Muqanna' was defeated in 162 or 163/778 or 779 after a campaign of two years.

Al-Manṣūr's armies were active in other parts of Iran as well. In 142/759 al-Manṣūr began the conquest of Ṭabaristān which had preserved its independence under its ancient rulers. Armies were also sent to Armenia to decrease the threat of attacks by the Khazars who had raided southward several times, sacking the Caspian port city of Darband (Arabic: *Bāb al-abwāb*) in 145/762. The Khārijites, though defeated by the early 'Abbāsids in northern Iraq and the Jazīra, continued to be a source of rebellion in Sīstān.

When al-Manṣūr died on 6 Dhu'l-Hijja 158/7 October 775, he left the 'Abbāsid dynasty firmly established and without serious contenders. He had cleverly anticipated and removed many of the traditional sources of disruption to the stability of the state and to smooth transfer of rule from one member of the 'Abbāsid family to another. As the 'Abbāsid revolution had used the slogans of the Shī'a yet rejected their essential goal, some of these contenders were, quite naturally, 'Alids. Al-Manṣūr purposely provoked a revolt by the most prominent 'Alid, Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya, whose consequent defeat and death in the Hijāz on 25 Ramadhān 145/6 December 762 for a time discouraged the 'Alids from openly opposing the 'Abbāsids. Al-Manṣūr had also discouraged the pretensions of the southern Iraqis to control the caliphate by moving his capital from the neighbourhood of Kūfa to a new city, Baghdad, especially constructed so that he would be surrounded by his army which, however, would not be concentrated in one spot but garrisoned on several sides of the city. Baghdad was also near the most convenient pass leading from Iraq to the Iranian plateau and Khurāsān, and the city gate facing this route was appropriately called "*Bāb al-Daula*". Al-Manṣūr's handling of his own family showed the same firmness as the rest of his administration. Like Abu'l-'Abbās he appointed many of his governors from his own family, the only group virtually certain not to feel that the 'Abbāsid

revolution had betrayed them. But he controlled his family as carefully as he controlled the other servants of the state, and in 147/764, after intimidating his relatives by killing his uncle, 'Abd-Allāh b. 'Alī, he changed the line of succession established by Abu'l-'Abbās to make his son al-Mahdī heir apparent.

Under al-Mahdī there was a change in caliphal policy towards religion and administration, a change which al-Manṣūr seems to have intended. This change reflected an inevitable shift from the fervour of a revolution, in which extravagant and ultimately unfulfillable hopes are raised, to a post-revolutionary situation in which an astute government seeks a moderate fulfilment of some of these hopes in order to survive. Al-Mahdī's throne title evoked the atmosphere of the 'Abbāsid revolution at which time the "divinely guided one" or *mahdī* was expected by many Muslims and even by some non-Muslims. Al-Manṣūr seems to have chosen this throne title in an effort to derive whatever support he could for his heir from the devotion to the dynasty formerly shown by the Hāshimiyya, the network of 'Abbāsid partisans who had plotted against the Umayyads. *Ḥadīths* in later sources, while contrived to fit the actual course of events, probably reflect the eschatological framework in which the earliest 'Abbāsids had sought support for their rule; one ḥadīth quotes Muḥammad as saying "By God, were no more than one day left to the world, God would cause the downfall of the Umayyads so that al-Saffāḥ (the bloodshedder), al-Manṣūr (he who is rendered victorious) and al-Mahdī would come."¹ (While Abu'l-'Abbās called himself al-Saffāḥ in his inaugural speech, until al-Mas'ūdī who wrote in the early 4th/10th century this title was used by Arabic authors for his uncle 'Abd-Allāh b. 'Alī who killed so many Umayyads.)

Yet by the end of al-Manṣūr's reign the original ideas of the Hāshimiyya were no longer an important prop to 'Abbāsid rule; and extreme forms of these ideas were a positive embarrassment to the ruling dynasty. When a few hundred members of the Rāvandiyya came from *Khurāsān* to worship al-Manṣūr as the living God, he was forced to attack and disperse them. The execution of Abū Muslim, the consequent rebelliousness of *Khurāsān* and the continued affection of the Kūfans for the 'Alids had dampened the enthusiasm of the Hāshimiyya itself. Under al-Mahdī the 'Abbāsids no longer emphasized that – as in

¹ 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Irbilī, *Khulāṣat al-dhahab al-masbūk* (a *mukhtaṣar* of Ibn al-Jauzī's *Siyar al-mulūk*) (Beirut?, 1885), p. 39.

fact had been the case – their ancestor Muḥammad b. 'Alī had received by testament both the imāmate and the secret organization of the 'Alid Abū Hāshim 'Abd-Allāh, who gave his name to the Hāshimiyya. Instead, "Hāshimiyya" was understood to refer to the supporters of Banū Hāshim, the clan of the Quraish which included Muḥammad and the head of which, after the death of 'Abd al-Muṭṭalib, was, in fact, their ancestor al-'Abbās. On this basis the 'Abbāsids claimed that the imāmate had belonged in their family without interruption from the time of Muḥammad's death. A specific genealogical argument was advanced to support their claim and to disprove the claim of certain descendants of 'Alī. Descent through their ancestor al-'Abbās, they said, was more important than descent through the female line of al-Fāṭima, the eldest daughter of Muḥammad and the wife of 'Alī, or than descent from 'Alī's father, Abū Ṭālib, an uncle of Muḥammad who never openly professed Islam; for al-'Abbās was a paternal uncle of Muḥammad and had become a Muslim. This position allowed the 'Abbāsids to seek the approval of the Sunnīs and those Shī'īs who felt that the 'Alid claim had died with some previous imām. Al-Mahdī furthered this policy of reconciliation by releasing political prisoners, choosing a Shī'ī vizier, and distributing gifts and pensions from the very full treasury left by al-Manṣūr; and if al-Mahdī persecuted Manichaeans, by doing so he probably increased his popularity with the majority of his subjects.

Under al-Mahdī there were some signs of the future weakness of the 'Abbāsids. Like al-Manṣūr, al-Mahdī wanted to change the line of succession established by his predecessor. He encouraged the 'Abbāsīd party in *Khurāsān* to demand that his sons Mūsā and Hārūn be made first and second in line of succession respectively; and to placate the former heir apparent, 'Īsā b. Mūsā, and his son, he distributed enormous sums of money and estates to both of them. He was the first caliph to have the bai'a or oath of allegiance taken to more than one son, a practice which eventually increased the number of pretenders to the caliphate. Al-Mahdī also anticipated the practices of future 'Abbāsīd caliphs by his retreat into an exalted isolation which made him increasingly dependent for any suggestions of policy on his chamberlain al-Rabī' b. Yūnus, his wife al-Khaizurān and other immediate associates.

At the accession of Mūsā al-Hādī (22 Muḥarram 169/4 August 785) the army mutinied and demanded additional pay as a gift; they burnt the gate of al-Rabī' b. Yūnus and only returned to obedience after receiving two years pay. This mutiny may have been the result not

only of al-Mahdī's clemency and generosity but also of his neglect to keep the army dispersed in detachments which would therefore find it difficult to make common cause with each other. This first entry of the central army into politics without the leadership of a pretender to the caliphate established a precedent which continued to trouble the 'Abbāsids until their loss of power. Al-Hādī's short reign did not allow him to develop any major policies except a reaction against the attempt to reconcile the 'Alids, whose support in any case, does not seem to have been won by al-Mahdī; and towards the end of his reign even al-Mahdī seems to have become more hostile to the Shī'is, at least to the Zaidīs. Al-Hādī's harsh treatment of the 'Alids provoked the rebellion, during the pilgrimage of 169/786, of al-Ḥusain b. 'Alī, a descendant of al-Ḥasan b. 'Alī, who was easily defeated at Fakhkh in the Ḥijāz. Al-Ḥusain's head was sent to Khurāsān to intimidate the Shī'is there who had disliked the anti-'Alid policy of the governor in the last years of al-Mahdī's caliphate. The battle at Fakhkh, though of small military importance, seems to have taught the 'Alids the lesson of the 'Abbāsid revolution: that efforts to establish a new caliphate should seek support in border provinces which were less accessible to the principal army of the caliphate and in which standing armies accustomed to continual warfare might feel very little loyalty to a remote caliph. From the battlefield at Fakhkh the founder of the Idrīsīd dynasty fled to Morocco and Yaḥyā b. 'Abd-Allāh fled to Dailam where he was the first of many 'Alids to receive the support of the warlike people of the southern Caspian coast.

Al-Hādī determined to make his son Ja'far the heir apparent, but his brother Hārūn, supported according to some accounts by Yaḥyā the Barmakid, refused to withdraw from the succession. Al-Hādī may have been killed by his mother al-Khaizurān, who resented her exclusion from politics and wanted her favourite son Hārūn to remain the first heir. When, therefore, Hārūn al-Rashīd succeeded to the caliphate on 15 Rabī' I 170/4 September 786, he felt deeply indebted to his mother and to her allies the Barmakids.

This remarkable Khurāsānian family was descended from the hereditary high priest of a Buddhist temple near Balkh. They had a long history of successful service to the 'Abbāsids in the course of which they developed a network of contacts and introduced important innovations into 'Abbāsid administrative practice. Khālīd b. Barmak was an adherent of the 'Abbāsid cause at the end of the Umayyad

period, and an important officer in the first 'Abbāsīd army. According to al-Jahshiyārī, at Abū Muslim's direction Khālīd arranged the land tax (*kharāj*) in Khurāsān at the time of the 'Abbāsīd revolution, and he did so with a spirit of fairness which made the Khurāsānians deeply grateful to him.¹ Abū'l-'Abbās put him in charge of the two important ministries of the army (*jund*) and land tax at which time he is supposed to have introduced the system of keeping records in *daftars* or codices instead of separate sheets.² Under al-Manṣūr he was demoted to the governorship of Fārs, which he held for two years, and subsequently he became governor of Ray, Ṭabaristān and Damāvand. Under al-Mahdī he was again governor of Fārs where he redistributed the *kharāj* and dropped a widely disliked and burdensome tax on orchards.

The first five 'Abbāsīds continued the centralization and elaboration of administration which had begun under the Umayyads. Al-Manṣūr separated judgeships from governorships, making their personnel and functions discrete, and is said to have been the first caliph personally to appoint judges in the important cities. To obtain better intelligence he required the *barīd* or postal service to report on provincial administration and prices more frequently and in greater detail than any earlier caliph; and even his son and heir al-Mahdī, when he was governor of western Iran, was under its surveillance. To control the increasing number of *dīvāns* or ministries in the central government, al-Mahdī in 162 created a separate *ẓimām*, literally, "a halter", to audit each existing *dīvān*; and in 168/784 he created the *dīvān ẓimām al-aẓimma*, a ministry to supervise these auditing bodies. While the central administration continued to be refined by the Barmakids under al-Rashīd, this caliph nevertheless in some respects halted the trend to centralization by allowing provincial governors more freedom than they had hitherto enjoyed. Under al-Rashīd the Aghlabids were permitted to hold a governorship in North Africa hereditarily as a *muqāta'a*, an arrangement which gave the governor financial and military control of his province in exchange for a fixed yearly tribute and acknowledgement of the caliph's position in the Friday prayer and on the coins issued in such a province. This arrangement was to be frequently imitated in Iran. The caliph, however, continued to take a direct hand in the choice of governors in the key provinces, often with unfortunate results. Al-Rashīd disregarded the protests of the Khurāsānians against the unauthorized increase in taxes under the governors 'Abd al-Jabbār b. 'Abd al-Rahmān and

¹ Jahshiyārī, p. 87.

² *Ibid.*, p. 89.

al-Musayyib b. Zuhair. When, however, al-Faḍl b. Sulaimān al-Ṭūsī and the Barmakid al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā, in an attempt to still this discontent, forwarded less money to al-Rashīd during their brief governorships because they burnt the books of arrears and invested taxes in local public works, they were dismissed.

With al-Rashīd's accession, Yaḥyā b. Khālīd became vizier, a title which originally had as much religious as administrative meaning. *Wazīr* in the Qur'ān designated the position which Aaron held as the helper of Moses, and it was in the spirit of the Qur'anic verse that the head of the 'Abbāsid *da'wa* in al-Kūfa, Abū Salama, even before the bai'a to Abu'l-'Abbās, was called *wazīr āl Muḥammad*, or vizier of the family of Muḥammad. Before al-Rashīd, the vizier had never been more than the first secretary in the administration; and it was not because Yaḥyā was appointed vizier but rather because both he and his sons and uncles were favoured with appointments to so many specific tasks in the government that their influence under al-Rashīd became great. In 176/792 al-Rashīd made al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā governor of the Jibāl, Ṭabaristān, Damāvand and Armenia, and in 178/794 he was made governor of Khurāsān where his administration was praised for its excellence. He was succeeded in this position in 180/796 by his brother Ja'far b. Yaḥyā who also supervised the barīd, or post-intelligence system, and the mints – this last an amazing privilege since the mints had always been under the supervision of the caliph alone.

One night in Ṣafar 187/January 803, Ja'far b. Yaḥyā was killed and the other principal Barmakids arrested. The sudden and dramatic fall of the Barmakids, usually represented as a puzzling and totally unexpected event, is associated by some sources with earlier events in Iran. According to al-Ṭabarī, 'Alī b. 'Īsā b. Māhān, the repressive governor of Khurāsān who replaced Ja'far, made al-Rashīd suspicious of the love which the Khurāsānians felt for the Barmakid family; and consequently al-Rashīd imprisoned Mūsā b. Yaḥyā in 186/802, then released him.¹ The affection of the Khurāsānians was certainly not the only reason that the Barmakids had been disgraced, and the arrest of Mūsā b. Yaḥyā was not the only previous sign that al-Rashīd was concerned by their increasing domination of the government. Whatever the causes of their fall, its result was to make clear that even the most powerful bureaucrat was only the servant of the caliph, and no vizier would be allowed full control of the government. V. V. Barthold

¹ Ṭabarī, vol. III, p. 675.

believed that the rôle of the Barmakids in the central government symbolized the co-operation of the Iranian "squirearchy" or class of dihqāns with the ruling family, and that the downfall of the Barmakids signalled the end of such co-operation.¹ The evidence for this very plausible theory is, however, ambiguous. The Barmakids probably favoured some Zoroastrian officials like the Banū Sahl and opposed anti-Iranian officials like Muḥammad b. Laith in their own self-interest and not because they were consciously advancing Iranian interests to the detriment of Arab interests. The two parties at court, the Barmakid party which included al-Khaizurān who died only a year before the Barmakids were disgraced, and their enemies led by al-Rashīd's wife Zubaida, cannot easily be identified as the pro-Iranian and pro-Arab parties since Zubaida's party included Iranians like 'Alī b. 'Īsā b. Māhān. The Barmakids may nonetheless have represented a specifically Khurāsānian interest at court and al-Rashīd's disregard of their support for the protests of the Khurāsānians against the extremely bad administration of 'Alī b. 'Īsā b. Māhān may have been part of an effort to decrease the dependence of the 'Abbāsids on Khurāsān.

Al-Rashīd had started towards Khurāsān in 189/804 because of a rumour that 'Alī intended to revolt; but the governor met al-Rashīd at Ray and, by his lavish gifts, persuaded the caliph not to interfere in his province. The rebellion of Khurāsānians in 191/807 finally brought home to al-Rashīd how far the misgovernment of 'Alī (and, possibly, the downfall of the Barmakids as well) had estranged the people of that province from the 'Abbāsids. The rebellion of 191 was not anti-Arab; for its leader, Rāfi' b. al-Laith, was a descendant of Naṣr b. Sayyār, the last Umayyad governor of Khurāsān. The cause of the rebels was popular not only in Khurāsān, but also in Transoxiana where the kings of al-Shāsh and the Turks supported it. Al-Rashīd made Harthama b. A'yan governor and had 'Alī b. 'Īsā arrested. In 192/808 the caliph, now thoroughly alarmed at the continuing disorder in all the eastern provinces, started travelling eastward during his final illness. Al-Rashīd's progress through western and central Iran was probably an occasion of administrative reform in that area for we know that he reformed the system of taxes in Qazvīn in 189/805 and took some districts away from Hamadān and Abhar-rūd in order to make Qazvīn a separate *kūra* or province, just as he had made Qum a separate *kūra*.²

¹ Article "Barmakids", *E.I.*¹.

² Ḥamd Allāh Mustaufī, *Tārīkh-i guzīda*, ed. 'A. Navā'i (Tehrān, 1339/1961), pp. 777 and 789.

Al-Rashīd died in Tūs on 13 Jumādā II 193/24 March 809 leaving the caliphate and most of its western provinces to his younger son al-Amīn while he left the heir apparenacy and all the provinces from the western borders of Hamadān eastward to his older son al-Ma'mūn, and he made a third son, al-Mu'tamin, third in line of succession as well as governor of the Jazīra and the cities bordering the Byzantine empire. By dividing the empire in this manner al-Rashīd had unintentionally made sure that his dangerous policy of alienating the Khurāsānians from the government in Baghdad would be fully realized. The Khurāsānians accepted al-Ma'mūn as one of their own and, because his mother was an Iranian, called him "son of our sister". The rebellion of Rāfi', which had begun because the distant government in Baghdad would not respond to protests against misrule in Khurāsān, had now lost its point and in 195/810 he surrendered himself to al-Ma'mūn who pardoned him. The poets at al-Amīn's court soon began to represent al-Ma'mūn and his vizier al-Faḍl b. Sahl, a Zoroastrian until 190/806, as opponents of Arabs and, by extension, of Islam itself. One poet said of al-Ma'mūn, "A power continuing that of Chosroes and his religion has gathered and the Muslims are humbled."

In 194/810 al-Amīn removed his brother al-Mu'tamin from the governorship of his provinces and ordered that in the *khutba*, or Friday sermon, prayers be said for his son Mūsā as well as for his brothers; on hearing this, al-Ma'mūn stopped the post from Khurāsān to Baghdad. Finally, al-Amīn asked for direct control of al-Ma'mūn's provinces; and when al-Ma'mūn refused, al-Amīn announced in 195/811 that his son was heir apparent to the caliphate, and ordered 'Alī b. 'Īsā b. Māhān to march on Khurāsān. In the face of his brother's hostility, al-Ma'mūn had courted the religious classes in Khurāsān and decreased the *kharāj* or land tax of that province by one quarter. His inaugural speech, delivered before the Khurāsānians, was surprisingly unautocratic and conciliatory for an 'Abbāsīd: "Oh people, I have taken it upon myself before God that, if he gives me charge of your affairs, I will obey him in dealing with you. I will not purposely shed blood except in lawful punishments and obligations imposed by God, nor will I take anyone's wealth . . . if the law forbids me."¹

Al-Amīn tried to gain the affection of the Khurāsānians by matching his brother's gesture and decreasing the *kharāj* of Khurāsān by one quarter. But al-Amīn who commanded the central armies of the

¹ Ya'qūbī, p. 167.

caliphate, including the army which had been with al-Rashīd at Ṭūs, foolishly sent the hated 'Alī b. 'Īsā b. Māhān against al-Ma'mūn's brilliant Khurāsānian general, Ṭāhir, who defeated both 'Alī and another army led by 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Jabala. The third army sent by al-Amīn returned without fighting Ṭāhir, and finally the abnā' al-daula revolted in Baghdad itself and gave the bai'a to al-Ma'mūn, so that Ṭāhir was able to take the city without much difficulty.

This second Khurāsānian conquest of Iraq was accomplished by an army much more clearly Iranian than the army of Abū Muslim. When al-Ma'mūn decided to remain in the East and made al-Ḥasan, a brother of al-Faḍl b. Sahl, governor of Baghdad, the Iraqis felt even more keenly that they were occupied by an alien army. After the Arab general Harthama b. A'yan defeated Shī'ī rebellions in southern Iraq and the Ḥijāz, he travelled to Khurāsān to inform the caliph how deeply al-Ḥasan's rule was disliked in the central provinces; but al-Faḍl persuaded the caliph to imprison Harthama immediately on his arrival. In 201/815 when news of this event came to Baghdad, the troops descended from the old Khurāsānian army, who were now as much or more Iraqi than Khurāsānian, joined the populace and drove al-Ḥasan out of the city, though eventually a peace was arranged and al-Ḥasan returned to Baghdad.

In 201/816 al-Ma'mūn proclaimed 'Alī b. Mūsā heir to the caliphate. 'Alī was the descendant of al-Ḥusain b. 'Alī whom the twelver Shī'īs regarded as the imām; and al-Ma'mūn, who was a philo-'Alid, chose him at least in part out of personal conviction. But when al-Ma'mūn chose for him a throne title which evoked the intellectual climate of the 'Abbāsid revolution, al-riḍā min āl Muḥammad, he seems to have hoped that Muslims would rally to a member of the Banū Hāshim who had no rôle in the quarrel between Iraq and Khurāsān (and within the 'Abbāsid family) which had so deeply divided the empire. Quite the opposite happened – the proclamation revived the quarrel, and the 'Abbāsid princes gladly supported the people and army of Baghdad in their new revolt. Even the Shī'ī Kūfans who presumably favoured the nomination of 'Alī al-Riḍā, put their regional loyalties above their traditional sympathy for the 'Alids, and consequently would not support the hated al-Ḥasan b. Sahl who represented the continued predominance of Khurāsān over Iraq. Al-Faḍl b. Sahl hid the seriousness of the rebellion from al-Ma'mūn until 'Alī al-Riḍā convinced the caliph in 202/817 to start for Iraq. Al-Faḍl b. Sahl and 'Alī al-Riḍā

conveniently died on the way; and the rebellion of the Iraqis collapsed on his arrival.

Ṭāhir had been fighting a rebel Arab chieftain in northern Syria, though without enthusiasm because of his dispute with al-Ḥasan b. Sahl, who had refused to supply or support him properly. Ṭāhir was now made governor of "all the West" (*maghrib*), and in 204/820 head of police in Baghdad; but he feared that al-Ma'mūn would hold him responsible for al-Amin's death, and longed to return to Khurāsān. In 205/821 he was made governor of the Jibāl and of Khurāsān, where he replaced Ghassān b. 'Abbād, a cousin of al-Faḍl b. Sahl. Al-Ma'mūn, whose troops had threatened to mutiny after al-Faḍl b. Sahl was arrested, may have appointed Ṭāhir to keep the affection of his Khurāsānian troops when he removed the remaining members of the Banū Sahl from the government. His son, 'Abd-Allāh b. Ṭāhir, was now given his father's former command, and was later made governor of the Jazīra and Egypt which he reduced to order with his Khurāsānian troops.

Al-Ma'mūn understood that the 'Abbāsids needed a new and wide basis of support to avoid excessive dependence on the increasingly independent Khurāsānians, and to win back the loyalty of the central provinces of the empire. For this reason, and from personal conviction, he attempted to enforce Mu'tazilism as the official form of Islam. He had already tried without success to use the philo-'Alid sentiments among some of the remnants of the original 'Abbāsīd party and among his Shī'ī subjects. He therefore turned to the Mu'tazilites, who may have been associates of the earliest 'Abbāsīd propaganda and who made the superiority of Abū Bakr over 'Alī a point of basic doctrine. Judges and witness-notaries (*shuhūd*) were required to testify to the central doctrine of the Mu'tazilites, the createdness of the Qur'ān. Ultimately, al-Ma'mūn's campaigns against the Byzantines won him far more respect among the religiously minded than his much resented interference in theology, just as the popular reputation of al-Mahdī and al-Rashīd for piety had been largely based on their pilgrimages and personal campaigns against the Eastern Romans.

In 218/833 al-Ma'mūn started the last significant effort by an 'Abbāsīd to conquer the Byzantine empire in its entirety. During this campaign, on 18 Rajab 218/9 August 833, al-Ma'mūn died and was succeeded by his brother al-Mu'taṣim. With al-Ma'mūn's death, the personal tie of the 'Abbāsīds with the Khurāsānians was broken and the end of this special relationship brought a fundamental and lasting

change in the character of the 'Abbāsīd state. Al-Mu'taṣīm, whose mother was Turkish, made Turkish slaves bought as boys and raised as professional soldiers the core of the caliphal army. Most of the Turks were from Farghāna and Ushrūsana; and two thousand Turks were sent to the caliph each year as tribute by 'Abd-Allāh b. Ṭāhir. Other elements still existed in the army, including the *maghāribā* (nomadic Arabs from Egypt), *Khazars*, the old *Khurāsānīan* detachments, and detachments from other parts of Iran.¹ The Turks, however, dominated the army of the central government from this time until the appearance of the Dailamites.

Under al-Ma'mūn appeared the most serious movement of local opposition in Western Iran since the 'Abbāsīd Revolution. The rebellion of Bābak, a Mazdakite, which had begun at *Badhhdh* between Arrān and Āzarbāijān in 200 or 201/816, continued an older tradition of Mazdakite or "*Khurramī*" resistance to 'Abbāsīd government in that part of Iran. Bābak received encouragement from Ḥātim b. Harthama b. A'yan, the governor of Āzarbāijān, who revolted when he heard that al-Ma'mūn had imprisoned and killed his father. By 218/833, after defeating four caliphal armies, Bābak controlled most of Āzarbāijān and some of the Jibāl where his followers, who were especially numerous at Masābadān and Mihrajānqadaq, now gathered in a military encampment in Hamadān province. The Bābakīs in the Jibāl were mostly farmers and no match for the troops of Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm, the governor of the Jibāl; after their defeat, many of them fled to the Byzantines. To defeat Bābak himself in the mountains of Āzarbāijān was more difficult, however, and al-Mu'taṣīm chose for this task the Afshīn, the Iranian king of Ushrūsana, who had been converted by al-Ma'mūn and entered the caliph's service with an army of his countrymen. The mountains made supply extremely difficult; therefore, after an unsuccessful campaign, a series of fortresses were constructed from Zanjān to Ardabīl and Bābak was finally besieged in *Badhhdh* which was taken on 20 Ramaḍān 222/26 August 837.

The movement of Bābak left followers in most parts of Iran, and several Iranian nobles were his adherents; but the violent rebellion of Māzyār, a king of Ṭabaristān who had become a Muslim at the hands of al-Ma'mūn, would have taken place even without Bābak's encouragement. Māzyār was governor of Ṭabaristān, Rūyān and Damāvand and, according to some sources, was encouraged by al-Mu'taṣīm to take the

¹ Mas'ūdī, vol. VII, p. 118.

governorship of Khurāsān from the Tāhirids whom that caliph feared. In any case, in 224/839 Māzyār refused to pay kharāj to the Tāhirids. His revolt soon developed into a social revolution; for when he found that the Islamicized land-owners of the Caspian were hostile to him, he came more and more to rely on the peasants and to voice their discontents. He ordered the peasants to attack their *katk^hudās* (village headman and usually the largest holder in the village) and to plunder their goods. The caliph, if he had seen any advantage in encouraging Māzyār, now recognized the danger of this rebellion to Islam, and consequently co-operated with 'Abd-Allāh b. Tāhir in putting down the revolt. Māzyār was defeated and killed in the same year. The rebel Mankjūr al-Farghānī, son of the Afshīn's maternal uncle and the Afshīn's representative as governor of Āzarbāijān, was accused of Bābakī sympathies as Māzyār had been. Al-Mu'taṣim had the same accusation brought against the Afshīn in 226/841 in which year he was tried and killed; but the real reason for his execution was probably al-Mu'taṣim's desire to rid his army of these powerful Iranian noblemen whose troops were usually more loyal to their commanders than to the caliph, and who, though they had been especially useful in fighting Bābak, were now not urgently needed. Māzyār and Mankjūr may, in fact, have rebelled because they correctly gauged their future under al-Mu'taṣim's philo-Turkish government.

When al-Mu'taṣim died on 18 Rabī' I 227/5 January 842, he left his heir a prisoner of the Turkish soldiers. Al-Mu'taṣim had moved the capital to Sāmarrā in 221/836 partly to avoid the frequent street fights between the Baghdādīs and the Turks, but even more to separate the Turks from outside influences so that they should maintain the manner of life which was thought to make them excellent soldiers; they were, in fact, forbidden to marry non-Turkish wives. The new caliph, al-Wāthiq, gave the Turks an excellent pretext for dominating the affairs of the caliphate by not appointing a successor, and it was the Turks who chose al-Mutawakkil to succeed on 23 Dhu'l-Hijja 232/11 August 847.

The principal events of al-Mutawakkil's reign were related to his attempts to free himself from his dependency on the Turks. He sought popular support by reversing the pro-Mu'tazilite policy which had pleased only a minority and had led to public protest under al-Wāthiq. His standing as a champion of the Sunnī majority was increased by his oppressive policy to non-Muslims and to the Shī'īs who were particu-

larly horrified when he ordered the tomb of al-Ḥusain to be destroyed. Al-Mutawakkil seems to have tried to gain more control over the administration by giving the governorship of the empire to his sons on the understanding that they would inherit portions of the government just as al-Amīn and al-Ma'mūn had. According to this arrangement, Ahvāz and the Jibāl were included in the share of the first heir, al-Muntaṣir, while Khurāsān, Āzarbāijān and Fārs went to al-Mu'tazz, the second heir. As al-Muntaṣir, the elder, was only thirteen at the time, a secretary was assigned to administer his provinces. It is likely that al-Mutawakkil tried in this way to avoid assigning provinces to his Turkish generals and to assert more direct control over these areas, since the secretaries were really answerable to the caliph, not to his sons. Five years later, the treasuries and mints in all regions were assigned to his sons. Nothing, however, released him from the control of the Turks. In 242 he contemplated moving the capital to Damascus where non-Arab influence was negligible and the population strongly anti-Shī'ī, but the Turks forced him to return to Sāmarrā. He tried to sow dissension among the Turkish leaders by taking the estates of one general, Waṣīf, and giving them to another, al-Faṭḥ b. Khāqān; but Waṣīf and a third general, Bughā, turned this dissension against the caliph and killed him along with al-Faṭḥ on the night of 4 Shawwāl 247/11 December 861. With this event whatever awe or respect had surrounded the caliph's person in the eyes of his Turkish troops disappeared. The alarming frequency with which the Turkish generals now changed caliphs made the next decade a period of confusion in which the degradation of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate seemed irreversible.

Al-Muntaṣir, the successor of al-Mutawakkil, had participated in the plot because his father intended to replace him in the succession by his brother al-Mu'tazz. Al-Muntaṣir died either of illness or poison on 3 Rabī' II 248/6 June 862, and the Turks made al-Musta'in, a grandson of al-Mutawakkil, caliph. The old Khurāsānian guard disliked this choice and fought the Turks for three days but were defeated. The Turkish generals fought with each other to control the caliph until the caliph moved to Baghdad with Waṣīf and Bughā. The Sāmarrā troops then chose al-Mu'tazz as caliph on 4 Muḥarram 252/25 January 866. Muḥammad b. 'Abd-Allāh, who held the office of chief of police in Baghdad as many Tāhirids had done before him, armed some of the populace and some passing Khurāsānian pilgrims to defend the city, but soon realized that a defence was hopeless; he surrendered to the

Sāmarran troops. Al-Mu'tazz tried to favour the *maghāriba* and *farāghina* as counterweights to the Turks, but delays in pay finally brought the army together against him and he was killed with Waṣīf and Bughā on 27 Rajab 255/11 July 869. The troops made Muḥammad b. al-Wāthiq caliph with the title al-Muhtadī, but Mūsā b. Bughā who was fighting in *Khurāsān* would not recognize him; and when the Turks in Sāmarrā saw that Muḥammad intended to favour the *farāghina* and *maghāriba* to lessen their power, they deposed him on 18 Rajab 256/21 June 870 and killed him four days later.

After Mūsā b. Bughā chose al-Mu'tamid, he agreed to a policy of co-operation with the caliphate which ended the confusion of the Sāmarrā period. The 'Abbāsids had partly won their struggle with the Turks; for the caliph was still powerful enough to encourage factionalism within the army and, increasingly, between the new generation of Turks and the older Turks, so that the resulting anarchy kept the troops irregularly paid and caused the deaths of almost all the leading Turkish generals except Mūsā. The Turks, even if they did not respect the caliph's person, needed a caliph to make the government stable; and they never seriously thought of transferring rule to one of themselves or even to a non-'Abbāsīd.

The confusion of the Sāmarrā period allowed the development of independent dynasties, not only because the army of the central government was occupied with affairs in the capital, but also because many governorships were assigned to Turks who stayed in Iraq and only sent representatives to their provinces. Rebellions continued to break out in *Āzarbāijān*, and one of the most serious of these, led by Muḥammad b. al-Ba'ith, was only defeated in 235/849 after three caliphal armies had been sent there. The Caspian provinces, subjected to bad government by the Ṭāhirids and the more direct representatives of the caliph, rebelled under a Zaidī pretender in 250/864 and were never again fully recovered by the 'Abbāsids. Most dangerous of all were the rebellions of the Ṣaffārīds of *Sīstān* and the Zanj, the black slaves of southern Iraq. At its high point, the Zanj rebellion extended into *Ahvāz* where they held *Ābādān* and *Wāsiṭ*. Mūsā b. Bughā began fighting the Zanj in *Dhu'l-Qa'da* 259/August 873; but his lack of success and the news that the province of *Fārs*, of which he was governor, had been occupied by a rebel caused him to withdraw from the campaign. He also resigned his governorship of the East "because of the many who had forcibly seized it [i.e., the eastern provinces of the empire],

and because he had no support against them". Al-Muwaffaq, the caliph's brother, trusted by Mūsā and increasingly the actual administrator of the empire, took over these tasks; and with the help of the Turks, he prevented the Ṣaffārid conquest of Baghdad and patiently drove back the Zanj until their complete defeat in Ṣafar 270/August 883.

When al-Muwaffaq died, his son al-Mu'taḍid assumed his father's rôle as actual administrator of the empire, and therefore succeeded his uncle as caliph, on 20 Rajab 279/18 October 892. The reigns of al-Mu'taḍid and his son al-Muktafī (acceded 22 Rabī' II 289/5 April 902) saw important victories in Iraq, where the Khārijites were defeated in the Jazīra, and the recovery of large parts of Iran. Abū Dulaf, al-Amin's governor of Hamadān, had been followed in that position by his son and grandsons, who had become increasingly independent of caliphal rule. In 281/894 Ḥārith b. 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Abī Dulaf gained control of Iṣfahān and Nihāvand but was defeated in the same year by the forces of the caliph, who now resumed direct control of all the Dulafid territories.

Both of these caliphs sought to preserve the recovered strength of the 'Abbāsids by making the bureaucracy more elaborate and hierarchical than it had been before, so that it could be the effective voice of the caliph in the day-to-day affairs of the government. As a result when al-Muktafī died on 12 Dhu'l-Qa'da 295/13 August 908 without having officially chosen a successor before death, it was a cabal of officials, not generals, which chose his thirteen-year-old son al-Muqtadir as caliph. Under the strong government of the preceding caliphs the army had become accustomed to regarding the vizier as the spokesman of the caliph and, therefore, as their superior. With the accession of the youngest caliph since the 'Abbāsīd revolution, the bureaucrats now had almost unrestrained control of affairs. Two factions of clerks, the Jarrāhids and Furātids took turns in office and the caliph allowed each incoming faction to fine and often torture the outgoing faction in order to enrich the treasury of the state.

A government budget of 306/918 provides an insight into the 'Abbāsīd administration of Iran in this period, especially when it is compared with a budget prepared under Hārūn al-Rashīd. Each item in either of these tax budgets might represent several tax districts together, but almost certainly would not represent a fraction of a tax district, since it is not likely that the government would divide out

subdistricts after taxes had been reported by a full district. If the budgets are examined with this principle in mind, they give some idea of the change in tax districts between the time of al-Rashīd and al-Muqtadir. The provinces of Khurāsān, Sīstān, Gurgān, Qūmis, Ṭabaristān and Gilān were no longer under direct 'Abbāsīd control. Āzarbāijān, Ahvāz, Fārs and Kirmān – insofar as they were controlled by the 'Abbāsīds – continued to be tax districts; but the government had separated out the tax districts of Qazvīn, Qum and Sāva, from the districts of Ray, Iṣfahān and Hamadān, and had separated the joint tax district of Nihāvand and Dīnavar into two districts.

At the centre of the government these districts were supervised by the various *dīvāns* (loosely, “ministries”) and *majlises* or “committees” under the vizier. Although lists of these *dīvāns* differ, there was a gradual increase in their number throughout the 'Abbāsīd period and, under al-Muqtadir, there were over twenty *dīvāns* in Baghdad. Communication of the government's orders to the provinces and classification of letters from provincial officials was the task of the chancery, *dīvān al-rasā'il*, which was aided in this task by the *dīvān* of the post (*al-barīd*) which also served as an intelligence service. The *dīvān* most actively concerned with provincial administration was the *dīvān al-kharāj* which supervised the land tax. This *dīvān* dealt with the provinces through separate *dīvāns* in Baghdad for each major tax district or group of districts. One of al-Mu'tadīd's reforms was to bring these *dīvāns* together as *dīvān al-dār* or *dīvān* of the palace. Later the *dīvān* of the East (*al-mashriq*), the *dīvān* of the West (*al-maghrib*) and the *dīvān* of the Sawād, a vast region of southern Iraq, were separated from the *dīvān* of the palace, which survived as an accountancy or records office for the *dīvāns* which actually administered the land tax. The *dīvān al-diyā'* or *dīvān* of caliphal estates supervised the vast properties directly owned by the central government. Linked to each of the financial *dīvāns* was a *dīvān al-ẓimām* as mentioned above.

The two officials appointed by the central government to run the provincial administration were the '*āmil li'l-ḥarb*' or *amīr*, the military governor, and the '*āmil li'l-kharāj*', or financial governor. Probably most military governors were professional soldiers, and they acted as local garrison commanders. Their appointments covered several tax districts, and presumably either their deputies or the heads of the local police were in charge of keeping order in safer provinces. The financial governor may sometimes have been subordinate to the military

governor, but was not ordinarily so. He not only paid local taxes but also paid the salaries of local officials and other government expenses out of local revenues, which made him a source of patronage used even by the central government. Ibn Abī Baghl, financial governor of Iṣfahān from 299/911–12 to 310/922–3 became so annoyed by the size of the packet of recommendations one man brought from Baghdad that he cried: “Every day one of you comes to us demanding a situation. If the treasuries of the whole world were at my disposal, they would by this time be exhausted.”¹

Under these officials were clerks, *jahbadhs* or experts in money matters, the *muhtasib* or market inspector, mintmasters, toll officials and officials in charge of irrigation. Judges were somewhat outside this system, for they were responsible to the chief judge or *qāḍi 'l-quḍāt* in Baghdad. The first Chief Judge was appointed by Hārūn al-Rashīd, but only later were provincial judges subordinated to him. In the confusion of later 'Abbāsīd times one or more headmen (singular *ra'īs*) appeared in Iranian towns because the towns needed spokesmen to deal with the rapidly changing governors and soldiers of fortune who held authority over them. These headmen owed their position more to local support than to the favour of the central government, and it is not surprising to hear that the headman of Qazvīn was held hostage by the 'Abbāsīds to assure the co-operation of his fellow townsmen. As the history of the Dulafīds shows, there was little that distinguished such popular local headmen from some of the “independent” dynasties which appeared in the 3rd/9th centuries except the official maintenance of a professional army.

At first, the excesses of the clerks in Baghdad seemed not to threaten the recovery of the post-Sāmarrā period. The often brilliant if corrupt viziers of this period skilfully used and played off the new semi-independent rulers against each other. The 'Abbāsīds, helped by the Sunnī Sāmānīds who had replaced the Ṭāhirīds as the great power in eastern Iran, continued to regain control over parts of central and western Iran. The Sāmānīds were important enough in the empire that the vizier in 296/908 considered their support a significant help if he should replace al-Muqtadir with another caliph. However, the sometimes conflicting ambitions of these two neighbouring powers prevented the Sāmānīds from becoming as closely associated with the 'Abbāsīds as the Ṭāhirīds had been. The ruler of Khurāsān was angry

¹ Tanūkhī, *Nishwār al-muhādara* (London, 1921), p. 183.

when the 'Abbāsid government gave refuge to one of their rebellious generals and his four thousand troops,¹ and sometimes the Sāmānids and 'Abbāsids would actually quarrel over control of certain provinces in central Iran.

Under al-Muqtadir, the regular army was led by Mu'nis, who had risen under al-Muwaffaq and retained some of the loyalty which that 'Abbāsid had inspired among his officers. Mu'nis recovered Fārs in 297/910 from the Ṣaffārīds who were weakened both by a quarrel with the governor of Fārs and by the pressure of Sāmānid attacks on Sīstān, their home province. Tribal groups were also used in the caliphal army; and in this period the partly Arab tribal leaders called the Ḥamdānīds, who were closer to Mu'nis and to the Jarrāḥīd clerks than to the Furātīds, became more prominent. They not only defended the Syrian and northern Iraqi borders of the caliphate but they also received assignments in Iran as governors of Qum and the Dīnavar road to Khurāsān. More dangerous allies were the Sājīds, a family from Ushrūsana who, as governors of Āzarbāijān, had created an army in that province loyal to themselves; and finally one of the Sājīd rulers, Yūsuf b. Abi 'l-Sāj, took Ray on his own initiative. Mu'nis, after several unsuccessful campaigns, defeated him in Āzarbāijān in 306/918 but gave this ever-rebellious province to Sabuk, one of Yūsuf's retainers, who, like his former master, usually did not forward the taxes to the central government.

All these gains by the 'Abbāsids in Iran were short lived, not only because governors had their own armies, but also because they had so little to fear from the central government. Al-Muqtadir, forgetting that he owed his throne to Mu'nis, who had suppressed a palace revolution in 296/909 and even defeated a dangerous Fāṭimid invasion of Egypt, plotted to kill his general in 315/927. Finally on 27 Shawwāl 320/31 October 932 the caliph decided on a direct contest of strength with Mu'nis; he rode against Mu'nis wearing the cloak and carrying the Rod of the Prophet, preceded by descendants of the first Muslims holding copies of the Qur'ān – in short, with all the symbols of caliphal authority. The caliph was killed. Al-Muhtadī had also tried unsuccessfully to evoke pious support in his struggle against the Turks; but the effect of al-Muqtadir's death was much greater. The ineffectiveness of both religious reverence and an extensive administration in the face of any determined opposition by the army was made unmistakably clear to

¹ Miskawaih, *Tajārib al-umam*, vol. 1, p. 16.

Muslims in all parts of the empire. As Muskūya (Miskawaih) (d. 421/1030) wrote, "it emboldened the enemies to achieve what they had never hoped for – to take possession of the capital. Since that time the caliphate has been weakened and the caliph's authority shattered."¹

The confusion at the centre of the government made it impossible for the 'Abbāsids to maintain their control of Western Iran. When Sabuk died in 310/922 the Sājīd Yūsuf was released and sent to govern Āzarbāijān, Ray and the intervening provinces. In 311/924 he captured Ray, which had been lost by the Sāmānids to rebellious governors. Ray was the gateway to central Iran; and the dizzying rapidity with which it changed hands in the next twenty years reflected the anarchy of a period in which there was no stable successor to 'Abbāsid rule in that area. It was occupied by the Sāmānids in 313 or 314, then by an independent commander who was a former Sāmānid governor from 314 to 316, then by the Zaidī ruler of Ṭabaristān, then by the soldier of fortune Asfār b. Shīrūya, who declared his loyalty to the Sāmānids only to be killed by his lieutenant, Mardāvīj. Mardāvīj defeated the caliphal governor of the Jibāl in 319/931 and direct 'Abbāsid rule in central Iran ceased. Shortly after this, 'Alī b. Būya, an officer in the army of Mardāvīj, revolted against that ruler and fled southward to Fārs where he defeated the semi-independent caliphal governor in Jumādā II 322/June 934, and occupied Shīrāz. After this event there was virtually no official on the Iranian plateau responsible to the caliph in Baghdad. 'Alī b. Būya sent his brother Aḥmad to Arrajān where in 326/938 he defeated the governor of Khūzistān and thereafter took Baghdad itself in Jumādā I 334/December 945. Asfār, Mardāvīj and 'Alī b. Būya were from Dailam, a geographical term used in this period for Gurgān, Ṭabaristān, Dailam proper and Gīlān. Henceforth Dailam was to be a major source of military manpower for western Iran and southern Iraq.

When Mu'nis was treacherously killed in 321/933 by al-Qāhir, who had become caliph after al-Muqtadir, the swollen and inefficient army which had just barely been able to hold onto the core of the caliphate could no longer defend the central government. The field was open for a new military leader to establish himself in Baghdad, and the caliph, who was in any case bankrupt, decided to make the best of the situation by choosing this leader himself. Therefore al-Rādī, who followed al-Qāhir as caliph on 6 Jumādā I 322/29 April 934, agreed to accept the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

offer of the semi-independent military governor of Wāsiṭ, Ibn Rā'iq, to defray all the expenses of the government including those of the army and the court. In exchange the caliph made him *amīr al-umarā'*, or supreme commander, and put him in charge of the principal ministries, giving him in effect "the management of the empire". Ibn Rā'iq's name was to be mentioned with that of the caliph in the *khutba* in all lands. Ibn Rā'iq arrived in Baghdad in *Dhu'l-Qa'da* 324/September 936; and in 325/936 he killed the remaining household troops of al-Rāḍī and thereby deprived the caliph of all actual military power.

Rival governors now fought to be the caliph's keeper or to set up their own candidates for the caliphate. The other supreme commanders, the Turks Bajkam and Tuzun, the Dailamite Kūrankīj and the Ḥamdānid Nāṣir al-Daula were all, like Ibn Rā'iq, professional soldiers. The only civilians to assume control of Baghdad in the decade of the supreme commanders were the clerk Ibn Muqla and the tax-farmer Abū 'Abd-Allāh Aḥmad al-Barīdī; and though both assumed the more traditional civilian titles of vizier, they had to assume the style of military commanders in order to survive; the subordination of the bureaucracy to the army was complete. None of these supreme commanders or viziers, however, gained sufficient strength to keep his office for any length of time, partly because Sunnī circles in the populace, government and army favoured Sunnī contenders, while *Shī'īs* favoured *Shī'īs* like the Ḥamdānids; and partly because there was enmity between the Turkish cavalry and the large new contingents of Dailamite footsoldiers.

It was only when the Barīdīs introduced the Būyids, who had a strong military base on the Iranian plateau, that a stable dynasty of supreme commanders arose. The Barīdīs had had the tax farm of *Khūzistān* since the reign of al-Qāhir, and had become independent in that province in 324/936; but when Ibn Rā'iq briefly occupied *Khūzistān*, Abū 'Abd-Allāh al-Barīdī took refuge in Fārs with 'Alī b. Būya who supported him. The Barīdīs not only recovered their province, they also occupied Baghdad more than once and were only driven from there by the Ḥamdānid ruler of Mosul in 330/942. The Ḥamdānid ruler, after struggling for a year with the factions of the capital while trying to keep his army of Arabs and Kurds together, left in disgust. But the position of al-Muttaqī, who had succeeded al-Rāḍī as caliph on 20 Rabī' I 329/23 December 940, under the Ḥamdānids foreshadowed the position of the

'Abbāsids for the next hundred years. A ruler who was a *Shī'ī* had occupied Baghdad at the head of an army united largely on principles of tribal loyalty. Unlike the rule of the earlier supreme commanders, Ḥamdānid rule could not be seen simply as a more severe form of that subjugation to the army which the 'Abbāsids had suffered before al-Muwaffaq. When the *Shī'ī* Būyids who led armies largely composed of Dailamites occupied Baghdad, the event was therefore not entirely novel in character. But it was appropriately seen by contemporary and later Muslim writers as marking an era in the history of the Muslim caliphate; for the Būyids, firmly in possession of Fārs, came with much greater military power than the Ḥamdānids possessed, and they came to stay. Less than a month after occupying Baghdad Aḥmad b. Būya deposed al-Mustakfī, who had been caliph since 20 Ṣafar 333/12 October 944.

With Aḥmad b. Būya's conquest of Baghdad, Iraq was again loosely tied politically with western Iran where his two brothers had large kingdoms of their own. This conquest therefore revived the long political association of Iraq and Iran, and ended the 'Abbāsīd attempt to make Iraq the centre of an empire whose heartlands included Egypt and Syria as much as it included the Iranian plateau. When the first 'Abbāsids had moved the capital from Syria to Iraq, they had made the Islamic empire less of a *ghāẓī* state, centred on former Byzantine territory near the new Byzantine borders, and more of a Mesopotamian (or Iraqi) state. To be a Mesopotamian state meant to be constantly compared with a Sāsānian imperial tradition. By force of such comparisons, the 'Abbāsids and their servants sometimes imitated that tradition self-consciously, if not accurately; for many of the "ancient Persian" ceremonies of the 'Abbāsīd court, like the Persian etymologies for administrative terms like *barīd*, were based on historical fictions satisfying to contemporary taste. Those who wished to denigrate the 'Abbāsids were no less eager to create fictitious resemblances to a period when men had lived in ignorance of Islam. Yet the 'Abbāsīd empire, for all its real or imagined family likeness to earlier Iranian empires, remained a Mesopotamian empire, not an empire which, though it had a capital in Mesopotamia, retained a special tie with the peoples of the Iranian plateau. The 'Abbāsids in the 4th/10th century lost control of Egypt, Syria and western Iran almost simultaneously; and the temporary loss of Fārs in an earlier period to the Ṣaffārids was no worse a blow than was the temporary loss of Egypt and part of

Syria to the Ṭūlūnids. With the breakdown of the 'Abbāsīd state, an older division reappears, in which Mesopotamia is often the natural extension of the power of the rulers of western Iran or of northern Iraq and Anatolia.

If the 'Abbāsīds had no special tie with the peoples of the Iranian plateau as a whole, they did at first have a special tie with a specific Khurāsānian army and, more loosely, with Khurāsān in general. As Abu'l-'Abbās said in his inaugural speech, the people of Khurāsān were especially designated by God to be partisans of the 'Abbāsīds; and when al-Manṣūr found that the Khurāsānians disliked the governor he sent, he decided that this governor was "destroying our party (*shī'a*)". Nevertheless, whether from overconfidence or from fear of dependency, the 'Abbāsīds loosened this special tie by a series of acts which the Khurāsānians could not easily forgive. Al-Manṣūr killed Abū Muslim, perhaps politically the most justifiable of all these acts. Al-Rashīd disgraced the Barmakids. But by far the worst damage was done by al-Rashīd's division of the empire between al-Amin and al-Ma'mūn; and with al-Ma'mūn's victory, the 'Abbāsīds found themselves dependent on the Khurāsānians in an altogether more dangerous way. The army of al-Ma'mūn was as loyal to its Iranian patrons as it was to the caliphs; al-Ma'mūn, as we have seen, not only was dependent on the Ṭāhirids but even had trouble with the army when he disposed of al-Faḍl b. Sahl. The civil war and the consequent dependency on Khurāsān also meant that the caliphate had lost all prestige in the eyes of the Arabs. Yet Muslim Iraqis were still passively obedient, because the attacks of the Khārijite and Shī'i Bedouin offered an alternative much less desirable than 'Abbāsīd government; and by the end of the 3rd/9th century some Iraqi Muslim theologians had made it a definite religious duty *not* to revolt. Nevertheless, this obedience covered a loss of loyalty, and sometimes even a covert hostility.

Al-Mu'taṣim's Turkish slave army, therefore, was not a personal whim but a pressing necessity. The Khurāsānian tie did not disappear immediately, and the Ṭāhirids, who were parvenus in the eyes of the nobility of eastern Iran, rightly prized the prestige that 'Abbāsīd recognition gave them. The Ṭāhirids continued to be chiefs of police in Baghdad; and it was so automatically assumed that Khurāsānians were their supporters that Muḥammad b. 'Abd-Allāh b. Ṭāhir armed the Khurāsānian pilgrims to defend al-Musta'in. Al-Ma'mūn's use of the Afshīn was one way of avoiding dependency on the Ṭāhirids; for the

people of Farghāna felt themselves to be separate from the Khurāsān-ians, and the Afshīn disliked the Tāhirids. But the most successful alternative to the Khurāsānians was the Turks; and if the Turks for a while chose and deposed caliphs as they wished, the ultimate revival of the 'Abbāsīd empire at the end of the 3rd/9th century was militarily a Turkish accomplishment.

To safeguard and pay for this accomplishment al-Muwaffaq, al-Mu'tadīd and al-Muktafī made the administration more elaborate than it had ever been before. More money was needed to maintain slave soldiers and mercenaries than to pay levies of free men, yet more territory was being lost from direct financial control as provincial governors arranged to hold their provinces by way of *muqāṭa'a* for a fixed tribute, which they often withheld in any case. The central government was therefore obliged to get as much revenue as it could from the sources which remained to it. By creating smaller tax districts and more *dīvāns* the government was able to have a closer and more effective oversight of the collection of revenue; at the same time new auditing *dīvāns* like the *dīvān al-dār* allowed a vigorous caliph to have a closer and more effective oversight of the operations of his officials. Not only did the 'Abbāsīds create a more refined bureaucracy, they also made greater use of tax-farming and of assignments of revenue rights called *iqṭā'*. These measures were successful as long as there was a strong caliph who kept the bureaucracy under his surveillance; but as soon as al-Muqtadir came to the throne, the bureaucrats destroyed the financial apparatus created in the previous reigns to ensure the maintenance of the army. As al-Muqtadir grew up he proved to be negligent and spendthrift in the same style as the caliphs of the Sāmarrā period; and when he foolishly provoked the army by his opposition to Mu'nis, it was only a matter of a few years before the 'Abbāsīds resigned themselves to the necessity of another dynasty's tutelage. The failure of the 'Abbāsīds to create anything more lasting and stable than a household administration is a failure which they share with all early Islamic dynasties.

In a sense, the 'Abbāsīds were less successful ideologically during their first empire, when they ruled a larger territory and were much more formidable to their enemies, than they were in the revived empire of the 3rd/9th century. There had been an internal contradiction in the ideology of the 'Abbāsīd state from the beginning: the empire was to be based on the unity of all Muslims, not an extension of power by a

relatively homogeneous group like the Syrian Arabs. Yet the empire was at first essentially an extension of the power of the Khurāsānian army, however much the 'Abbāsids tried to represent the Khurāsānians as playing only the rôle of military guardians for the Islamic state. From the beginning circumstances forced the 'Abbāsids to make choices which caused parts of the Islamic community to feel excluded from participation in their rule. They had to choose between the religious groups which had brought them to power: the Hāshimiyya, the Shī'is and the anti-Umayyad Sunnīs. They chose the Sunnīs but were never completely successful in convincing the Sunnīs that their interest and that of the 'Abbāsids was the same. Then, thanks to al-Rashīd's treatment of the Barmakids and the question of succession, the 'Abbāsids and their subjects had to choose between Iraq and Khurāsān. This choice proved the undoing of the original 'Abbāsid empire, and only when the new Turkish army agreed to co-operate with the caliphs could a second 'Abbāsid empire be formed.

The second 'Abbāsid empire was militarily limited, but ideologically successful, because the 'Abbāsids, despite their failure to dictate an official form of orthodoxy under al-Ma'mūn, al-Mu'taṣim, and al-Wāthiq, seem to have convinced most members of the religious class throughout the empire that in principle many Islamic institutions could function properly only if the reigning 'Abbāsid caliph recognized them. In the vast majority of cases, the 'Abbāsids had disguised their loss of power by giving the new independent rulers deeds delegating the caliph's authority to them by official appointment. The independent rulers wanted these deeds of appointment for, as Bīrūnī wrote in the 5th/11th century, "the common people in the large cities have become accustomed to the 'Abbāsid claim, and have been inclined to their rule, and obey them out of a sense of religion, and consider them possessed with the right to command".¹ Most Muslims believed that their community could not be divided against itself, and, though they were often disloyal to individual caliphs, they were nonetheless upholders of the principle of the caliphate. This principle, they felt, not only satisfied established theological requirements, but was to their advantage in that it gave them the same right to "citizenship" in any kingdom within the empire, and the same right to demand (though not always to receive) the protection of the sacred law of Islam, the sharī'a. Almost everywhere, if no rival caliph was recognized, the 'Abbāsid caliph's name

¹ Bīrūnī, *al-Jamābir fī ma'rifat al-jawābir* (Hyderabad, 1355/1936), p. 23.

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continued after 334/946 to be inscribed on coins and mentioned in the Friday prayer. In the long run, the greatest contribution of the 'Abbāsids to Islamic society was their fostering of Islamic institutions, and they were repaid by the continuing reverence in which their caliphate was held as guarantor of these institutions long after their non-ideological instruments of power had been lost.



Map. 1. Iran under the 'Abbāsids

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Volume Editor's Note

The bibliographies printed below are selective and not intended to be complete; in general they include those works used by each author in the preparation of his chapter. It has not been possible to check the source references of all authors, especially where rare editions of texts have been used. As a rule books and articles superseded by later publications have not been included.

The abbreviations and short titles used in the bibliographies are listed below.

<i>AA</i>	<i>Arts asiatiques</i> (Paris)
<i>AESC</i>	<i>Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations</i> (Paris)
<i>AGNT</i>	<i>Archiv für die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik</i> (Leipzig)
<i>AGWG</i>	<i>Abhandlungen der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen</i> (Berlin)
<i>AI</i>	<i>Ars Islamica</i> (Ann Arbor, Mich.)
<i>AIEO</i>	<i>Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales</i> (Paris–Algiers)
<i>AIUON</i>	<i>Annali, Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli</i> (Naples)
<i>AJSLL</i>	<i>The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures</i> (Chicago)
<i>ANS</i>	American Numismatic Society
<i>ANSMN</i>	<i>American Numismatic Society Museum Notes</i> (New York)
<i>ANSNNM</i>	<i>American Numismatic Society Numismatic Notes and Monographs</i> (New York)
<i>ANSNS</i>	<i>American Numismatic Society Numismatic Studies</i> (New York)
<i>AO</i>	<i>Ars Orientalis</i> (continuation of <i>Ars Islamica</i>) (Ann Arbor, Mich.)
<i>BAIPAA</i>	<i>Bulletin of the American Institute for Persian Art and Archaeology</i> (New York)
<i>BGA</i>	<i>Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum</i> , 8 vols. (Leiden)
<i>BIFAO</i>	<i>Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale</i> (Cairo)
<i>BSOAS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i> (London)
<i>EI</i>	<i>Encyclopedia of Islam</i> (Leiden)
<i>GMS</i>	“E. J. W. Gibb Memorial” series (Leiden–London)
<i>IA</i>	<i>Iranica Antiqua</i> (Leiden)
<i>IC</i>	<i>Islamic Culture</i> (Hyderabad)
<i>IQ</i>	<i>Islamic Quarterly</i> (London)
<i>Iran</i>	<i>Iran</i> (journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies) (London–Tehrān)
<i>Iraq</i>	<i>Iraq</i> (journal of the British School of Archaeology in Iraq) (London)

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| <i>JA</i> | <i>Journal asiatique</i> (Paris) |
| <i>JAOS</i> | <i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i> (New York) |
| <i>JESHO</i> | <i>Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient</i> (Leiden) |
| <i>JNES</i> | <i>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</i> (continuation of <i>American Journal of Semitic Languages</i>) (Chicago) |
| <i>JRAS</i> | <i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i> (London) |
| <i>JSS</i> | <i>Journal of Semitic Studies</i> (Manchester) |
| <i>MRASB</i> | <i>Memoirs of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal</i> (Calcutta) |
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| <i>RENLO</i> | <i>Revue de l'École Nationale des Langues Orientales</i> (Paris) |
| <i>RFLM</i> | <i>Revue de la Faculté des Lettres de Meched</i> (Mashhad) |
| <i>RFLT</i> | <i>Revue de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Téhéran</i> (Tehrān) |
| <i>RN</i> | <i>Revue numismatique</i> (Paris) |
| <i>SBWAW</i> | <i>Sitzungsberichte der Wiener (Österreichischen) Akademie der Wissenschaften</i> (Vienna) |
| <i>Syria</i> | <i>Syria</i> (revue d'art oriental et d'archéologie) (Paris) |
| <i>WZKM</i> | <i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes</i> (Vienna) |
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CHAPTER I

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